Through its use of the Arctic, Russia tries to fortify the idea that it is a global Energy Superpower, writes Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen.

The Arctic arouses many associations and emotions. For elderly people, it appears as a Cold War battlefield with submarine chases, closed military compounds and local environmental problems. Due to the development that we experienced in the 1990s and 2000s, among younger generations, the Arctic primarily evokes thoughts on ‘soft’ topics, such as cooperation between inter-governmental institutions, non-governmental organisations and Northern indigenous people

During the last decade, the Arctic cooperation agenda emphasising the grass-roots level has witnessed the revival of so-called ‘hard’ issues. There are high hopes that environmental change will open new resources for extraction, and in the tow of economic ambitions, geopolitics is once again taking a more pivotal role in defining the Arctic. The ‘Arctic Paradox’, i.e. the fact that climate change enables the exploitation of new Northern energy resources that then further intensifies the climate change, seems to be being ignored as the great power discourse becomes stronger. In addition, X-factors related to the Northern cryosphere – the ‘Sphere of the Ice’ – under a changing climate, such as the direct and indirect societal and environmental effects of melting permafrost, are being papered over while the economic prospects are exaggerated. This seems to be particularly true in Russia, where the Arctic is actively being turned into a geopolitically more central area that is interwoven in a novel way with nation-building and Russia’s identity construction as a great power.

Russia’s great-power ambitions coalesce in the Arctic at least in three ways. Via the Arctic, Russia is staking out and palisading a new territory that emphasises traditional sovereignty. Moreover, it aims to become an economic great power with the help of the region’s natural resources and sea routes, and to strengthen the image that Russia is a global energy superpower. Despite all this Russian blustering Lebensraum-thinking, the Arctic policy of the future will also be defined by cooperation. Without external technical knowledge and skills, Russia’s Arctic rush cannot succeed.

Therefore, more knowledge is needed on how Russia’s energy policies are forming in the riptide of domestic factors, global companies and international politics, and how environmental responsibilities are being taken care of. The new Arctic research projects with which our team is engaging – Russia’s Final Energy Frontier – Sustainability Challenges of the Russian Far North, funded by the Academy of Finland and carried out with our Japanese colleagues led by Prof. Shinichiro Tabata under the auspices of the

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science; the Academy of Finland’s ARKTIKO programme project, Assessing Intermediary Expertise in Cross-Border Arctic Energy Development with the renowned American Arctic anthropologist, Dr. Arthur Mason; and the MERMAID project led by the Finnish Meteorological Institute and funded by the Prime Minister’s Office – all focus on these issues.

It is very likely that we will see a balance between emphasising ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ topics in Russia’s Arctic policies. That is why it is possible to understand Russia’s age-old tendencies to both open itself to the world and to huddle within and shut itself away through the Arctic. Because of the ‘bases-loaded’ situation delineating Russia’s Arctic policies, the course of action that is taken in the near future will reflect more generally Russia’s policy choices.

Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen works as a Professor of Russian energy policy at the University of Helsinki